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Free eBook Cabinet Ministers and Parliamentary Government (Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions) download

by Michael Laver,Kenneth A. Shepsle

Free eBook Cabinet Ministers and Parliamentary Government (Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions) download ISBN: 0521432464
Author: Michael Laver,Kenneth A. Shepsle
Publisher: Cambridge University Press (September 30, 1994)
Language: English
Pages: 327
Category: Social Sciences
Subcategory: Politics and Government
Size MP3: 1678 mb
Size FLAC: 1265 mb
Rating: 4.7
Format: mobi mbr rtf docx


Start by marking Cabinet Ministers And Parliamentary Government as Want to Read . One of the key constitutional features of a parliamentary democracy is that the political executive, or cabinet, derives its mandate from - and is politically responsible to - the legislature.

Start by marking Cabinet Ministers And Parliamentary Government as Want to Read: Want to Read savin. What makes a parliamentary democracy democratic is that, once a legislative election has been held, the new legislature has the power to dismiss the incumbent executive and replace i One of the key constitutional features of a parliamentary democracy is that the political executive, or cabinet, derives its mandate from - and is politically responsible to - the legislature.

Laver, Michael, Shepsle, Kenneth A. Date. Political economy of institutions and decisions. Cambridge University Press. 0521432464, 0521438373. This item appears on. List: British Politics: Prime Ministers, Parties and Parliament POL3080.

Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions. Jack Knight, Institutions and Social Conict Michael Laver and Kenneth Shepsle, ed. Cabinet Ministers and Parliamentary. Stephen Ansolabehere, Harvard University. List: Perspectives on the UK Parliament POL3083.

Michael Laver, Kenneth A. Shepsle. Making and Breaking Governments offers a theoretical argument about how parliamentary parties form governments, deriving from the political and social context of such government formation its generic sequential process. Based on their policy preferences, and their beliefs about what policies will be forthcoming from different conceivable governments, parties behave strategically in the game in which government portfolios are allocated. The authors construct a mathematical model of allocation of ministerial portfolios, formulated as a noncooperative game, and.

Recommend this journal. Canadian Journal of Political Science/Revue canadienne de science politique.

Advocates of parliamentary rule have been highly critical of presidentialism . Perspectives on Political Science. Series: Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions. Paperback: 378 pages.

Advocates of parliamentary rule have been highly critical of presidentialism for dividing powers and providing the opportunity for gridlock between branches. Yet the great theorists of presidential rule saw in the same institutions a desirable combination of strong leadership with checks on executive discretion. These diverse assessments arise because we have surprisingly little comparative work on how presidential democracies function. This book brings together a superb group of collaborators.

At the cabinet level, junior ministers are employed to shadow ministers belonging to other coalition .

At the cabinet level, junior ministers are employed to shadow ministers belonging to other coalition parties (Thies, 2001) and the doctrines of individual ministerial and collective cabinet responsibility facilitate the management of crises and disaccord within the cabinet (Gallagher, et a. 2006: 40-3; Rhodes, 2006). The renewed attention to the role of legislatures in parliamentary policymaking rests on the centrality of legislative institutions in managing agency problems.

Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions) .

Making and breaking governments : cabinets and legislatures in parliamentary democracies, Michael Laver, Kenneth A. Material type: BookSeries: Political economy of institutions and decisions. by Laver, Michael ; Shepsle, Kenneth A. Publisher: Cambridge ; New York : Cambridge University Press, 1996Description: xi, 301 p. : ill.

One of the key constitutional features of a parliamentary democracy is that the political executive, or cabinet, derives its mandate from - and is politically responsible to - the legislature. What makes a parliamentary democracy democratic is that, once a legislative election has been held, the new legislature has the power to dismiss the incumbent executive and replace it with a new one. Moreover, it sits essentially as a court, passing continual judgement on the record of the executive, and continuous sentence on its future prospects. That is how citizens, indirectly, choose and control their government. But the relationship between legislature and executive is not one-sided. The executive typically has the authority to recommend dissolution of parliament and is usually drawn from the parliament. Executive personnel, therefore, have intimate familiarity with parliamentary practices; and for their part, parliamentary personnel aspire to executive appointments. Surprisingly little is known about the constitutional relationship between legislature and executive in parliamentary regimes; the present volume seeks to remedy this.