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Free eBook Intelligence and U.S. Foreign Policy: Iraq, 9/11, and Misguided Reform download

by Paul Pillar

Free eBook Intelligence and U.S. Foreign Policy: Iraq, 9/11, and Misguided Reform download ISBN: 0231157924
Author: Paul Pillar
Publisher: Columbia University Press; First Printing edition (September 6, 2011)
Language: English
Pages: 432
Category: Social Sciences
Subcategory: Politics and Government
Size MP3: 1638 mb
Size FLAC: 1780 mb
Rating: 4.8
Format: mobi lit lrf mbr


Pillar's book details how US intelligence became the scapegoat for bad decisions made by US leadership based on flawed models of the world . The 9/11 Terrorist Attacks: A Failure of Policy Not Strategic Intelligence Analysis. Intelligence and National Security.

Pillar's book details how US intelligence became the scapegoat for bad decisions made by US leadership based on flawed models of the world situation. Professor Pillar's book is perhaps the best assessment to date of a continuing problem that US intelligence must deal with, though it is not the only one of merit. Other writers with a good understanding of intelligence have reached similar conclusions.

foreign policy during the Cold War and highlights the small role intelligence played in those decisions, and he demonstrates the negligible effect that America's most notorious intelligence failures had on . policy and interests.

Read Intelligence and . Read unlimited books and audiobooks on the web, iPad, iPhone and Android. Pillar offers an original approach to better informing . policy, which involves insulating intelligence management from politicization and reducing the politically appointed layer in the executive branch to combat slanted perceptions of foreign threats.

A career of nearly three decades with the CIA and the National Intelligence Council showed Paul R. Pillar that intelligence reforms, especially measures enacted since 9/11, can be deeply misguided. They often miss the sources that underwrite failed policy and misperceive our ability to read outside influences.

Mobile version (beta). Foreign Policy: Iraq, 9 11, and Misguided Reform. Download (pdf, . 1 Mb) Donate Read. Epub FB2 mobi txt RTF.

Paul R. Pillar, a retired CIA officer, is nonresident senior fellow at Georgetown University's Center for Security Studies and author of Intelligence and . Foreign Policy: Iraq, 9/11, and Misguided Reform. Stories by Paul R. Pillar. Good While It Lasted. Argument. Paul R. November 13, 2012, 10:48 PM. Think Again: Intelligence. Think Again. January 3, 2012, 2:38 AM. Don’t Blame the Spies. March 16, 2011, 8:12 PM. Yes, America Is Exporting Terrorism.

Three recent books on national security and the politics of intelligence .

Three recent books on national security and the politics of intelligence assessments. MORE BY Lawrence D. Freedman. January/February 2012. Fixing the Facts: National Security and the Politics of Intelligence (Cornell Studies in Security Affairs).

A career of nearly three decades with the CIA and the National Intelligence Council showed Paul R. They also misconceive the intelligence-policy relationship and promote changes that weaken ng operations. In this book, Pillar confronts the intelligence myths Americans have come to rely on to explain national tragedies, including the belief that intelligence drives.

book by Paul R. A career of nearly three decades with the CIA and the National Intelligence Council showed Paul R. Pillar is a Nonresident Senior Fellow at the Center for Security Studies of Georgetown University and at the Brookings Institution. The Illusion of Reform12. Adapting Policy to x. He served in several senior positions with the CIA and the National Intelligence Council and is a retired army reserve officer. He is the author of Terrorism and . Foreign Policy and Negotiating Peace: War Termination as a Bargaining Process. Country of Publication.

A career of nearly three decades with the CIA and the National Intelligence Council showed Paul R. Pillar that intelligence reforms, especially measures enacted since 9/11, can be deeply misguided. They often miss the sources that underwrite failed policy and misperceive our ability to read outside influences. They also misconceive the intelligence-policy relationship and promote changes that weaken intelligence-gathering operations.In this book, Pillar confronts the intelligence myths Americans have come to rely on to explain national tragedies, including the belief that intelligence drives major national security decisions and can be fixed to avoid future failures. Pillar believes these assumptions waste critical resources and create harmful policies, diverting attention away from smarter reform, and they keep Americans from recognizing the limits of obtainable knowledge.Pillar revisits U.S. foreign policy during the Cold War and highlights the small role intelligence played in those decisions, and he demonstrates the negligible effect that America's most notorious intelligence failures had on U.S. policy and interests. He then reviews in detail the events of 9/11 and the 2003 invasion of Iraq, condemning the 9/11 commission and the George W. Bush administration for their portrayals of the role of intelligence. Pillar offers an original approach to better informing U.S. policy, which involves insulating intelligence management from politicization and reducing the politically appointed layer in the executive branch to combat slanted perceptions of foreign threats. Pillar concludes with principles for adapting foreign policy to inevitable uncertainties.
User reviews
betelgeuze
The core of this book is a scathing critique of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (aka 9/11 Commission). It makes a persuasive argument that the 9/11 Commission inquiry and its subsequent report were more an exercise in public relations and political gamesmanship than a serious study of the events associated with the 9/11 tragedy. The argument is made that the staff director of the Commission, Philip Zelikow, not only was politically biased toward the Bush Administration, but entered into the inquiry with a predetermined agenda to "reform" the U.S. Intelligence Community by creating a new layer to an already top heavy bureaucracy by advocating the position of Director of National Intelligence (DNI) to oversee the entire IC.

Pillar appears to have done a good deal of thinking about the complicated issue of how intelligence relates to policy and how domestic political considerations can influence both. Although his uses the 9/11 Commission report as the center piece of his thinking, he discusses other examples of what is sometimes called `politicalization' of intelligence as well. He makes the important point that intelligence often is used to sell policy rather than inform it. He notes that in the run up to operation Iraqi Freedom, the administration of President George W Bush appears to have decided upon a military invasion of Iraq with no discernable evidence of a formal decision making process. Once the decision was made, intelligence reporting was considered principally as a means of selling the decision to the American public and Congress. The events of 9/11 were sized upon as a catalyst to build public support for the invasion of Iraq.

This is an important book that makes a major contribution to the understanding of how the U.S. Intelligence System actually works. Yet Pillar is after all a retired CIA intelligence officer who in his last years was head of the CIA Counter Terrorism Center (CTC) then National Intelligence Officer (NIO) for the Near East. So of course he has a few axes of his own to grind with this book. For this reason he tends to obfuscate CIA's failures and rationalize its mistakes. He also appears at times to be isolated from the day to day business of intelligence production as evidenced by his remark about the "uninspiring work of transcription and translation" a misrepresentation comparable to those made by the 9/11 Commission.
Sinredeemer
For anyone who reads either the report of the "National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States" (the 9/11 Commission report) or the report of "The Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction" (the WMD Commission report), this book is required reading. It provides a much-needed balance to the mistaken impression of an intelligence failure that was created in the two commission reports. Intelligence did fail, in both instances. But the intelligence failures were preceded by a series of policy failures. And the flawed Iraqi WMD result, as the book points out, was primarily due to improper pressures from the Executive Branch and intelligence leadership's inability to counteract those. Pillar's book details how US intelligence became the scapegoat for bad decisions made by US leadership based on flawed models of the world situation.
Professor Pillar's book is perhaps the best assessment to date of a continuing problem that US intelligence must deal with, though it is not the only one of merit. Other writers with a good understanding of intelligence have reached similar conclusions. For example, Professor Stephen Marrin, of the University of Brunel, UK, noted that
"Contrary to conventional wisdom, the description of 9/11 as an intelligence failure may be misplaced. Intelligence agencies provided decisionmakers with strategic warning of the coming threat from al Qaeda, but strategic warning did not lead to an effective strategic response. Instead, policymakers relied on intelligence agencies to "get lucky" at the tactical level (detection and disruption). This approach worked until, inevitably, it didn't.
Much emphasis has been placed on this tactical `failure to connect the dots'.... But is this tactical failure the most important intelligence-related lesson that can be derived from the 9/11 attacks? In my opinion, the answer is `no.' More important are the strategic policy failures that preceded the tactical intelligence failures.
Why does this matter? If this analysis is correct, it implies that much of the effort devoted to fixing or reforming intelligence capabilities after 9/11 would not prevent its recurrence. If we want to prevent the next strategic surprise, we have to stop focusing on the tactical intelligence failures that occurred and instead raise our sights to understand why not enough was done about the terrorist threat well before the events of 9/11 took place." (Stephen Marrin. "The 9/11 Terrorist Attacks: A Failure of Policy Not Strategic Intelligence Analysis. Intelligence and National Security. (2011) 26:2-3, 182-202)
Pillar's book also deals extensively with intelligence reform that has taken place since 2001, especially the changes embodied in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004. His conclusions are not encouraging: Reform has been a step backward. It has added to the bureaucracy without reducing the risk of failures.
We want our intelligence analysts to "tell it like it is," to produce the best possible intelligence, uncolored by pressures to produce a specific outcome. Unfortunately, such pressures do exist. They can come from the outside or inside of the analyst's organization, and they usually are very subtle. This book details how those pressures have worked to produce a number of "intelligence failures" over history - Vietnam being the most egregious of many prior to the Iraqi WMD mis-call. The book's conclusion is that US intelligence is heavily influenced by policymaker preferences and will continue to be so. Pillar's book should be read not only by those in the intelligence community, but also by policymakers and decision-makers who do not wish to repeat recent history.
Jay
Amazing book, eye opening and highly recommended even for people not interested in politics.
Maman
Well written. Keeps me up late reading. Probably only people who care about intelligence, foreign policy or contemporary history would agree. Wish everyone did.
Nidora
A must reading for anyone that is interested in the way the US is politizing the "war on terrorism" which is a misnomer since one cannot fight a concept and how the Bush administration "sold" this unnecessary war on a county that had nothing to do with 9/11. Bush was warned but fired the messenger.
C Turner MD,MS,NREMT-P,FACS
Nnulam
Way too redundant. Same things could have been said in no more than one-half the words. That said, the infomation was interesting and important.